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STEPHAN HERZBERG 
In Metaphysics A 6-7 Aristotle gives a more precise elaboration of several 
features which characterize the mode of being of the first principle (eternal, 
pure actuality, free of matter, metaphysically simple; moving without itself 
being moved, in the highest degree intelligible and desirable; pure thinking, 
best and eternal life). In this article I will be concerned exclusively with the 
feature of thinking in the sense that the first principle is not only the highest 
object of thinking, but it is itself pure thinking. When at Met. A 7, 1072b14-
26 Aristotle ascribes to the first principle a certain kind of life, and qualifies 
this more specifically as the activity of reason in the mode of contemplation, he argues for this feature in a significantly different way from the previous characteristics. In what follows I will develop and defend an interpretation of this passage according to which we are here dealing with an argument �rom analogy. _ On my reading, Aristotle wants to show in this passage how lt is that we can determine the 'pure actuality' of the first principle based on 
�he highest realization of human thought. He succeeds in doing so by show­ing that in human thinking there is a special 'structure of actuality', which, h?wever, due to his ontological perfection has to be present in God in a higher form. I will show that, contrary to the usual reading of this passage, t�e interpretation developed in this essay requires fewer additional assump­tions, is closer to the text and, in general, can better accommodate the unique topic discussed at Met. A 6-7. 
The following article is a reworked and shortened version of chapter 4 of Herzberg, S. 2013: Menschliche und göttliche Kontemplation. Eine Untersuchung zum bios theoretikos bei Aristoteles, Heidelberg. I thank Manfred Weltecke for translating my text into English. 
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1. The Thesis (1072b14-16) 
"And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short 
time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be)" .2 
(1072b14-16) 
This is a thesis which consists of two parts: ( 1) the first principle leads a life 
(ötaycoY"l), i.e., the mode of its actuality or activity (evepyeta)3 is identified as 
a form of life,4 and (2) this form of life is comparable with the best of our 
own, which we, however, can only enjoy for a short time. Both parts of the 
thesis deserve a detailed elucidation. 
By beginning the sentence with ötaycoyiJ Aristotle wants to draw our at­
tention to the fact that saying of the first principle, on which heaven and 
nature depend, that it leads a certain life, is an astonishing claim indeed. 5 
What do we know, at this point, about the mode of being of this first princi­
ple? In order to guarantee the eternal and uninterrupted motion of the first 
heaven, the first principle must be eternal and, in addition, in actuality. More 
precisely, it must be in actuality in the special way that it is not the actuality 
of an underlying potentiality. If it were the actuality of an underlying potenti­
ality, then it would also be possible that its potentiality might, at times, not 
be actualized and would, therefore, not generate any motion. Yet since the 
motion has always existed, Aristotle reaches the conclusion that this principle 
has to be actuality according to its own essence, i .e. its essence is actuality. 
So it must not possess any kind of potentiality. 6 Furthermore, being an actus purus of this kind the first principle is without matter, inasmuch as matter is 
the principle of potentiality. These features or predicates of perfection form 
a first series of predicates by which the essence of the first principle is charac­
terized more precisely. Aristotle derives these characteristics in a purely con­
ceptual way (wyq>):7 his starting point is the question of how the nature of 
2 Barnes, J. 1984: The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton. Volume II. All translations 
are from Barnes unless otherwise indicated. 
3 See Horn, C. 2002: In welchem Sinn enthält Metaphysik Lambda eine Theologie? In: Jahr­
buch für Religionsphilosophie, 1, 39 on this double meaning of tv&pyew. 
4 Cf. also E. N. X 4, 1175al2: iJ 6e �Tl tvepyeux �-
5 See Laks, A. 2000: Metaphysics A 7, in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), Aristotle's Metaphysics 
Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford, 232: "Whether one renders the term by 'way 
of life' or, perhaps more neutrally, by 'occupation', something more than mere existence is 
presupposed, namely a life." See also Bordt, M. 2006: Aristoteles' Metaphysik XII, Darm­
stadt, 116 f. 
6 Cf. Met. A 6, 1071b19 f.: 6ei 6.pa elvat apxi)v -rowiiT11V �<; iJ ou<rla tv&pyew. See also A 7, 
1072a32; A 8, 1074a35 f. 
7 Cf. Bordt (see note 5), 101. 
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something that can guarantee an eternal and continuous motion must be conceived. This then leads him to the concept of 'pure actuality'. This con­cept describes the essence of the first principle of motion and the other (two) characteristics are connected with this concept via a conceptual necessity. 8 Within a second series of predicates the first principle is qualified further; more precisely, it is thus qualified with regard to the eternal and uninterrupt­ed motion of the first heaven. The first feature in this series characterizes the first principle as moving other things, while it itself is unmoved.9 In support of this claim Aristotle gives the following argument: "There is therefore also something which moves them. And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is a mover which moves without being moved, being eter­nal, substance, and actuality" (A 7, 1072a23-26).10 Aristotle develops this argument further at Phys. VIII 5. Here he proves the necessary existence of some unmoved moving being. 11 The eternal and immaterial substance, which essence consists in actuality and which is identified as unmoved, moves in the way an object of desire and thought moves other things, and this is the second feature in this series of predicates. For objects of desire and thought �ove as mere final causes, without being moved themselves. In order to JUstify that the first principle does de facto move other things in this way, 12 Aristotle tries to show that the primary instances of what is desirable and what is thinkable are identical: The primarily desirable is not that which just 
8 
9 
To this first series other characteristics can be added, e.g. that owing to its pure actuality 
this principle "can in no way be otherwise than as it is" (A 7, 107268) and that it is 
"absolutely necessary" (b13); or the characteristics that this principle exists "separate from 
sensible things" (1073a4 f.), is "without parts and indivisible" (1073a6f.; see also A9, 
l075a6 f.) and "one both in formula and in number" (A 8, 1074a36 f.; I owe this last point 
to Lloyd Gerson). Following Horn (see note 3) one may indeed call these "divine attributes" 
(32 f.) or also "predicates of perfection" (41). 
Bordt, M. 2011: Why Aristotle's God is Not the Unmoved Mover, in: Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy, 40, 91-109 is right to point out that to be an unmoved mover is not 
an essential feature of the first substance, but merely a relational one, i.e., it has this feature 
only in relation to the realm of the perceptible and changeable substances (see previously 
Menn, S. 1992: Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good, in: Review of Meta­
physics, 45, 545). The first substance is later identified with God (1072b30), not insofar as 
it is an unmoved mover but insofar as it leads the best kind of life, which is the activity of reason. 
lO At this point it becomes clear that the second series of predicates is joined with the first 
Series (CXfaWV tcai ouoia Kai 6V&pr6UX OOO'll). 11 There is no agreement as to which passage of Phys. VIII 5 Aristotle is referring here. See 
Laks (see note 5), 217-219, for more details on this question. 12 See Bordt (see note 9), 107: "Aristotle is not interested only in some general claim to the 
effect that there are cases where something unmoved can move something eise; rather, he 
is aiming eo show that one very particular state of affairs actually obtains, namely that the 
unmoved mover in fact does move (what it moves) as an object of thought and desire". 
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appears good to someone ('to <pmv6µevov KaA.6v), but that which is real good 
('to öv KM6v). The latter is not an object of appetite (em0uµia), but of rational 
desire or wish (ßouA.ricn�). This, however, implies a judgment of reason.13 The 
theoretical basis for such a definition of the 1tpro-rov ÖpEKt6v is Aristotle's 
objective theory of the good: 14 "For the apparent good is the object of appe­
tite, and the real good is the primary object of wish. But desire is consequent 
on opinion rather than opinion on desire: for the thinking is the starting­
point" (1072a27-30). The paradigm among the objects of thought is deter­
mined by means of what is "in itself thinkable", that is by means of a positive 
series of concepts ( crucr-roixia) .15 In this positive series substance ( oucria) comes 
first and within this genus of being the simple and fully actual substance (it 
a.1tAii Kai Kat' evspysiav: 1072a30-32) comes first.16 The first intelligible, i.e. 
the highest object of thought, is thus the immaterial and essentially actual 
substance, which, as such, has the highest ontological determination (or 'pos­
itivity' ). In this positive systoichia we also find the KaA.6v, i.e. that which is 
desirable for its own sake and laudable.17 The first principle of motion is 
always the best or it is at least that which is analogous to the best (1072a34-
b1).18 The unmoved mover, as the highest object of thought and desire, thus 
moves everything eise by being its ultimate final cause. lt does this solely by 
the attractiveness of its ontological perfection. As an absolute unchangeable 
and self-sufficient telos, 19 which is separate from perceivable reality, it moves 
the first heaven by being loved (ro� eproµevov) and through this motion every­
thing eise is moved (1072b3 f.).20 Therefore Aristotle can say that heaven and 
13 Cf. De an. III 9, 432b5-7; III 10, 433a24-30; Rhet. l 10, 1368b36-1369a4. 
14 Cf. Horn (see note 3), 35 f. 
15 On the origin of this ontological ordering instrument in the Old Academy see Krämer, H.-J. 
1964: Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus 
zwischen Platon und Plotin, Amsterdam, 153-159. 
16 With this, the series sketched in Met. A 1, 1069a20 f. (tcp eq,e.;f\c;;) is differentiated further; 
in this passage Aristotle is merely dealing with ouoia as the primary being as opposed to 
quality, quantity, motion, and negation. 
17 For the term KaMv see Met. M 3, 1078a31 f.; E. E. VIII 3, 1248b18-20. 
18 For this identification of the best with the highest object of thinking, see also Met. A 2, 
982b6 f.: toilto 5' tatl tciya9ov eKacnou, öAfl>c;; 5t to liptcnov tv tfl q,i>aet nacrn. The unmoved 
mover, as the primary object of wisdom, is also what is best in the entire cosmos. 
19 Cf. Met. A 7, 1072b2 f.; E. E. VIII 3, 1249b15 f. For Aristotle's distinction between ou äveKa 
ttv6c;; (the absolute aim) and ou äveKa ttvi (the beneficiary) see Gaiser, K. 1969: Das zweifa­
che Telos bei Aristoteles, in: I. Düring (ed.), Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theo­
phrast, Heidelberg, 97-113. 
20 The platonic background is emphasized by Richardson Lear, G. 2004: Happy Lives and the 
Highest Good. An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Princeton, 79: "Aristotle's 
Prime Mover is an object of desire of a special sort: lt is an object of Platonic love. As such, 
it is a final cause as an object of aspiration, imitation, or approximation. Such an end may 
be, in principle, unchangeable as weil as separable from the physical world." 
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the world of nature depend (ilP'tTl'tat: 1072613 f.) on such a principle. Yet the beings below the first heaven are also related to the first principle as their ultimate final cause. For every being tries to partake in the eternal and divine to the greatest extent possible.21 This striving towards the divine, which we find in the entire cosmos, is manifest in the fact that every being imitates the divine substance, i.e. its perfect (eternal and pure) actuality, according to the 
Possibilities inherent in its own essence. 22 Thus the entire cosmos is revealed as a universal interrelated whole that imitates the divine way of being.23 For the individual being to imitate the divine actuality in its own specific way is 
for it to realize its own nature in the best possible way. 24 Through these two series of predicates we now know that the first princi­ple of motion is a special kind of substance which, on the one hand, is essen­tially actuality (from which other predicates, e.g. , that it is immaterial, invari­ant, necessary, indivisible, simple etc. may be derived) and, on the other hand, that it is something which is, in the highest degree, intelligible and desirable and which, thus, moves everything eise as a principally unmoved and separate substance and as their final cause. At this point one might think that the characterization of the mode of being of the first principle is com­pleted. The open questions which Aristotle had raised with regard to this third kind of substance, at least those pertaining to its existence and es­sence,25 now seem to have been clarified. lt has been shown that an eternal and unmoved substance necessarily exists and that its essence is pure actual­ity. 
21 Cf. De an. II 4, 415a29 f.: ... rva toii la:i Kai toß 9eiov µe-rtxromv 1l 6uvavta1· irlwra yap 
tice{vou 6ptye-ra1 ... 22 Cf. E. N. X 7, 1177b33 f.; De an. II 4, 415a26-b7; De gen. an. II 1, 731b24-732a11; De 
gen. et corr. II 10, 337al-7, Met. IX 8, 1050b28 f. 23 Cf. Sedley, D. 2007: Creationisrn and Its Critics in Antiquity, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Lon­don, 171: "lt is, in short, scarcely an exaggeration to say that for Aristode the entire 
functioning of the natural world, as also that of the heavens, is ultirnately to be understood 
as a shared striving towards godlike actuality." According to Sedley, Aristotle manages to 
harrnonize two contrasting rnotives by having recourse to the platonic view of God as the 
highest object of irnitation: that God is a transcendent substance separate frorn the world and that God is the highest explanatory principle of reality. See also Menn (see note 9), 
573. 24 Cf. Richardson Lear (see note 20), 86: " . .• when we approxirnate the divine to the extent possible for us, we realize our own nature." 
25 Cf. the fourth aporia (Met. III 1, 995b13-18; III 2, 997a34-998a19), where Aristotle states that it is necessary to clarify whether there are other substances separate frorn those which We can perceive and whether these exist in one or several kinds. Concerning the question about the existence and rnode of being of the separate substance see also Met. VII 2, 1028h27-32 (x6tepov e!al nv� ,rapa t� alalhJt� ii ou,c eia{, Kal CMal itli><; sla{, Kal x6tepov llan � XOJPIO'rr( ouala ... ) and A 1, 1069a33 f. 
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When at Met. A 7, 1072b14-30 Aristotle qualifies the 'pure actuality ' of the first principle more precisely as life and ascribes a very specific kind of life to the first principle, i.e., the activity of thinking, which - as will emerge -this principle is according to its essence ( 1072b27),26 this is, in my view, not in line with the characteristics mentioned up to this point. Whereas the characteristics of the 'first series' were "conceptually" derived from the es­sential predicate of 'pure actuality ' and whereas such a method of deduction could, in principle, also be given for the characteristics of the 'second se­ries', 27 this is impossible in the case of the characteristics of life and the activity of reason. First, life is only a certain kind of actuality among others 
(E. N. X 4, 1175a12: ,; öe �rot) evepyeia •�). Moreover, "life" is predicated in many ways (De an. II 2, 413a22; Top. VI 10, 148a26-31). The concept of actuality or activity (evspyeta), which describes the essence of the unmoved mover, is an analogical concept which is applied in entirely different areas of being (Met. IX 6, 1048b6-9). Thus, it is, in principle, thinkable that the first principle - as an immaterial, unmoved and separate substance - could have an entirely different mode of actuality from the ones familiar to us, i.e., the mode of actuality which is life in the sense of the activity of reason. In E. N. X 8 Aristotle says that the activity of God "surpasses all others in blessed­ness" ( 1178b21 f.: ffiCJ'tE iJ 'tO'U 0eou evspyeta, µa1Cap16nrn Ötacpspoucra . . .  ). In the famous fragment from the lost treatise "On prayer" Aristotle mentions the two options that the God "is either intellect or something more beyond intellect" (fr. 49 Rose) .28 For Aristotle it is precisely the complete ontological determination and separation - which the first principle has on account of its 'pure actuality ' - that make it into something which simpliciter or "by nature" is most known. Yet because of this the first principle is, from the perspective of our finite knowledge, which begins with perception, most re­mote.29 As is weil known, Aristotle compares the relation of our reason to the things "which are by nature most evident of all" to the relation that the eyes of bats have to daylight (Met. II 1, 993b7-11). This epistemic distance of the first principle results from its ontological perfection or transcendence, even if, for Aristotle, this transcendence does not go as far as Plato's tn:sKetVa 
26 God does not have an intellect, which he exercises, for then it would be possible, in prind­
ple, that this intellect might at one time not be actualised. Rather, God is the activity of the 
intellect itself and thus pure thinking or activity of reason. Cf. Menn (see note 9), 561 f.; 
Bordt (see note 9), 92. 
27 One could deduce the fact that God is unmoved also from the immateriality and see the 
highest intelligibility grounded in the complete actuality qua determination. 
28 o 0e� i\ voßi; &<rrlv i\ &1tßlCEtvt'l n tou vou. Like Gehler (1997, 6O f.) I take this alternative to 
be strictly disjunctive. The second alternative is a terminological reference to the Platonic 
e1tt1eewo. 'ti'ji; oi>mo.i; at Pol. 5O9b. 
29 Cf. Anal. Post. I 2, 71b33-72a5; Met. VII 3, 1O29b4-12. 
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tfi� oucria�: the first principle is oucria in the absolute primary sense. lt mani­fests in a perfect and thus also paradigmatic way what it means to be, and, as such, it belongs - in contrast to Plato - to the logical space of being. On account of the transcendence of the first principle it is understandable that Aristotle expresses himself carefully in part (ii) of the thesis quoted above: "And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time" (1072b14-16). Here our best way of life serves as an element of a comparison (ofo iJ apicrrri).30 Therefore, Aristotle thinks that we can take the highest form of human life which we can enjoy as our departing point 
�hen we want to qualify the kind of life the first principle enjoys. In my view - and this is crucial for a proper understanding of this passage - we are dealing here with an assumption which stands in need of justification. This n_eed of justification follows from the ontological perfection of the first prin­ctple we discussed earlier and from the resulting 'epistemic distance' from us. !he justification for this thesis is developed in section 1072b18-24. Accord­ing to my own reading of this passage, Aristotle claims to have shown why We are entitled to use the "to us better known" highest activity of human beings, contemplation (0empia),31 in order to characterize the perfect actuality of God more closely. Most commentators overlook that at 1072b14 f. Aris­�otle expresses a thesis which calls for a more detailed justification. Accord­ing to the standard reading, Aristode simply assumes that the mode of life of the first principle is of the same kind as our best form of life, i.e. 0eropia, �ithout offering any further arguments for this assumption. 32 When engaged 
10 contemplation human beings exercise, for a short time, exactly the same �ind of activity which God exercises at all times. On the basis of this assump­tion in 1072b18-24 Aristotle is supposed to be in a position to illustrate or explain divine thinking with reference to human thinking. 33 However, against 
3o Cf. Laks (see note' 5), 233. In this context Laks rightly points out that this leaves it open 
whether this is an identity or a mere similarity. See also Kosman, A. 2000: Metaphysics 
A 9: Divine Thought, in: M. Frede/D. Charles (eds.), Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda. Sym­
posium Aristotelicum, Oxford, 309: "Aristotle there sets out to give us an idea of the mode 
of existence of this being, known up to now only as a principle of activity, and he does so 
by means of a figurative account that relies upon simile to convey to the reader that mode of existence". 31 Cf. E. N. X 7, 1177a18; X 8, 1178b7-32. 32 Cf. for example Ross, W. D. 1924 (ed.): Aristotle's Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Intro­
duction and Commentary, Oxford II, 378: " . . .  Aristotle assumes that it must be such as the 
highest actuality or activity that we know, viz·. v6TJ�, immediate or intuitive knowledge." 33 Cf. Bordt (see note 5), 116: According to Bordt, Aristotle can proceed in this way because there is no categorical difference between the rational activity of human beings and the rational activity of the first ousia. Ibid. 118: According to Bordt, what holds for human reason also holds with the exception of continuance and duration for the rational activity 
of the first principle. 
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the assumption of such a unity one can advance the following prima facie arguments: Nowhere does Aristotle state that divine and human thinking are of the same kind. Rather, in E. N. X 8 the question of what kind of similarity it is that holds between human and divine contemplation, is precisely left open (1178b27). A strong argument against the assumption of an identity in kind, with a gradual difference merely with regard to temporal duration, is the passage which concludes our section of the text: "If, then, God is always (asi) in that good state in which we sometimes (1to1:e) are, this compels our wonder; and if in a higher degree (µillov), this compels it yet more. And God is in such a state (fx,st 6E ci>ös)" ( 1072b24-26; Barnes with modifica­tions). That µillov should here carry a merely quantitative-temporal differ­ence can be ruled out, as this difference is already expressed in the previous sentence.34 If it is the case that "even things different in species admit of degree" (E. N. VIII 2, 1155b14 f.35), then it is reasonable to suppose that this difference refers to the activity itself, i.e. to the essence of 0scopia. In this case the God would realize what it means to be active in the mode of contempla­tion in a way still higher than human beings, namely in a perfect, unlimited way. This kind of difference, or rather the eminence of divine contemplation, has to be elaborated further on the basis of the text. lt suffices, at this point, to keep in mind that a merely temporal difference for µIDJ..ov is ruled out, and that the indicated difference is explicitly maintained to exist (fx,st 5s ci>5e: 1072b26). In what follows I will develop an interpretation of the passage 1072b14-26 in which a unity of kind of divine and human contemplation is, contrary to the standard interpretation, precisely not assumed. Rather, on my view, in this passage Aristotle wants to show why it is legitimate at all to further characterize the form of life of the first principle on the basis of our most consummate form of life. 36 
34 Cf. Wedin, M. V. 1988: Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, New Haven/London, 228, 233: 
"But the passage indicates a difference in the state itself and, thus, certainly appears to 
countenance difference in kind." See also Kosman (see note 30), 311: "The view that Aris­
totle offers, it seems, is not simply that God thinks as we do, only all the time rather than 
merely some of the time; it is rather that God engages in an activity that is like thinking, 
but something more." See also E. E. VII 12, 1245b16-19. 
35 " .. . whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is 
only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even 
things different in species admit of degree." 
36 See also Gabriel, M. 2006: Gottes transzendenter Seinsvollzug. Zur Aristotelischen Onto· 
theologie im A der Metaphysik, in: Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie, 5, 99, 113n54, who 
reads the section 1072b20-24 as an analogical extrapolation. See previously Oehler, K. 
21985: Die Lehre vom Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles. 
Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bewusstseinsproblems in der Antike, Ham­
burg, 203. 
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II. Thinking as a suitable Candidate ( 1072614-19) 
Now if, according to its very nature, the first principle is actuality, and if this 
actuality consists in leading (c5tayroyif) a form of life, which is comparable to 
?ur best form of life, then this ötayroyif, which is not yet qualified any further, 
18 true of the first principle always: "And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be)" (1072b14-16). Aristotle mentions an additional reason for the excellence of the first principle's form of life: "since its actuality is also pleas­ure" .  37 For if pleasure accompanies a perfect activity as a supervenient perfec­tion, 38 and if the first principle, according to its very nature, is actuality or 
activity, then the first principle is essentially also pleasure and, therefore, 
pure pleasure (cf. E. N. VII 15, 1154b25 f.).39 In view of this perfect activity 
With its pure pleasure, which is not yet qualified any further, human activities like waking, perceiving and thinking (to their various different degrees) are pleasant in a derivative sense. Hopes and memories in turn are pleasurable 
insofar as they relate to these activities: "And therefore waking, perception 
and thinking are very pleasant (ilchcrtov),40 and hopes and memories are so because of their reference to these (activities)" (1072b17 f.). 
Now, in what kind of activity does the öuxyroyif of the first principle consist? How can this activity, to which pleasure belongs as such or simplici­ter, be further qualified? In 1072b17-8, Aristotle lists three activities of hu­tnan life which are each pleasant to a high degree (waking, perceiving, and thinking). The' next sentence addresses thinking "in itself" :  "And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense" (ti Ö6 v611� f1 Ka8' 
aütriv -roß Ka0' au-ro apimou, 1eal ti µrAtcrta -roß µllA.tcrta: 1072b18-9; trans. Barnes with modifications). Now, it makes a great difference to how we understand this passage, whether we do or do not read Aristotle in such a Way, that he assumes the unity in kind of divine and human thinking (or 8scop{a) right from the beginning. Commentators making this assumption 
0ften think that the statement just quoted (1072b18-9) relates to the di­vine thinking itself. According to the 'positive systoichia' mentioned in l072a31 f., the highest object of thinking would be the simple and essentially 
37 67tci Kai i'Joovl'J Tl EVSP'}'Eta ( 1072b16). On this see Laks (see note 5), 233 f. 38 Cf. E. N. X 4, 1 1 74b31-33; X 5, 1175a29f. 39 See also Bordt (see note 5), 1 17: According to Bordt, what pleasure is becomes paradigmati­cally clear from the real activity of the first principle, because in this case pleasure appears in its purest and fullest form. 4o Because of the derivative character I read tjöunov in an elative sense (cf. also Laks (see note 
5), 233). 
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actual substance. From this it would follow - though left unmentioned here 
by Aristotle - that the object of God's thinking must be God himself. After 
all, the object of his thinking is "that which is best in the fullest sense" .  
Otherwise something eise would be better, which would mean that God is 
not the highest being. 41 This implicit divine thinking-himself would then be 
explained further by the following sentences ( 1072b20-24) with reference to 
human thinking. Because of the assumed identity of kind with divine think­
ing, human thinking likewise has a self-referential structure (a1hov oe vo&t 6 
vofü;), and has it in the same sense as divine thinking. 
One can, however, think of another way in which the expression it oe 
VOTJ� it Ka0' auritv in 1072b18 f .  could be interpreted. I will develop this 
interpretation in what follows. Not only does it not need to assume a unity 
of kind, it can also avoid the assumption of a conclusion which is not drawn 
expressis verbis.42 
This interpretation can give the passage 1072b14-26 an altogether more 
philosophically sophisticated sense insofar as it shows that this passage can 
be regarded as a consistent justification for why we are entitled to qualify 
the form of life of the first principle by starting from our own highest form 
of life. 
After Aristotle has mentioned waking, perceiving and thinking in 
1072b17 from the human sphere, which are pleasant with respect to the 
'pure activity' and 'pure pleasure' of the first principle, he selects from these 
41 Cf. Ross (see note 32) II, 379: "In order to find the connexion between these two sentences, 
it seems necessary to suppose that when Aristotle says that the divine v611cru; 11 tea9' aut1'v 
is of to tea9' mho lipmov he means the condusion to be drawn 'and therefore of the divine 
voOi; itself' , which has been exhibited as the 11:pö:>1:ov 6p&IC't6v (a27), in other words as the 
lip1CJtov (a35). He then goes on to show how voOi; knows itself". Cf. Oehler, K. 1974: 
Aristotle on Self-Knowledge, in: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1 18, 
499: "Since the highest type of activity is thought, Aristotle defines the nature of the Prime 
Mover to be thought, and thought in its purest form, that is as pure Noesis, without restric­
tion to the sensory content of perception and imagination. The object of this highest, purest 
Noesis of the Prime Mover is that which is best in itself; that which is in the highest degree 
· thought has as its object that which is in the highest degree good [ . . .  ] lt is hardly surprising 
that Aristotle does not add expressis verbis the condusion 'therefore the Prime Mover 
thinks itself'. The notebook-like style of Book Lambda makes the enthymeme appropriate". 
42 Norman, R. 1969: Aristotle's philosopher-God, in: Phronesis, 1 4, 63-74 argues against such 
an ' implicit syllogism' . According to him, such a syllogism would disrupt the continuity of 
the argument developed from 1072b15 to 1072b26 unnecessarily (68 f.). Regardless of this 
point, with which I agree, although it is not further developed based on the text, Norman 
also defends the problematic thesis that the unmoved mover has to be ascribed the same 
kind of thinking as humans, i.e. the autov vo&iv, which Norman (with reference to Aristotle's 
analysis in De an. III 4, 429b5-9) contrasts as a "theoretical" kind of thinking with a 
"receptive" kind (67). 
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three activities thinking or activity of reason (v6ricn�) in the next sentence: 
"And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which 
is thinking in the fu11est sense with that which is best in the fu11est sense" 
( 1072b18-9) . Thus the partide öe in 11 öe v6TJ� 11 Ka0' auTI)v is not used in 
a connective-adversative sense - as in the standard interpretation - i.e., in 
such a way as to imply that human v6ricn� were here contrasted with divine 
v6ricr�. Rather, the partide ÖE is understood in a connective-continuative 
sense; it refers back to the previously mentioned vori�-43 This thinking is 
considered in a certain respect, namely "as such" (Ka0' auttjv). Especially if 
0ne takes into account the context of Aristotle's psychology, the qualifier 
JCa0' mh6 plays the role of highlighting a faculty with respect to its very own 
function (fpyov), for the sake of which it came into being. lt also highlights 
a faculty with respect to the objects (ta avttKsiµeva) through which it is de­
fined44, or with respect to an effect it produces by itself.45 In the case of 
thinking this means to abstract from the specific human dependence on per­
ception and imagination (cpavtao"ia).46 This dependence is reflected on the 
0ne hand in the fact that we have to examine the perceptible objects with 
their immanent forms (to elöo� to ev6v)47 if we want to acquire knowledge 
(tmcrttjµ11) about the world,48 and, on the other band, in the fact that every 
act of human thinking is accompanied by some content of the imagination 
(�avtacrµaw).49 This dependence of thinking on cp<lV'tacria and thus on percep­
tion implies that in human beings thinking cannot separate itself from their 
bodies (De an. I 1 ,  4O3a8-1O; III 7, 431a16 f.) .  If, therefore, thinking is 
considered "in• itself" this particular dependence of human thinking on sensi­
bility is disregarded. 
Now, although it is the case that the thinking of God, as we learn in Met. A 9, is an eternal, non-procedural thinking not dependent on perception 
or imagination,50 it is not necessary to assume that at 1O72b18 f. Aristotle 
43 Cf. Denniston, J. D. 21950: The Greek Particles, Oxford, 162. 44 In this way the different senses are determined by the "objects perceptible in themselves" (De an. II 6). 
45 Cf. the discussion on the movement of the soul (De an. I 3, 406a7, al 1, b15). 46 Cf. De an. III 3, 427b14-16; III 7, 431a14-17, 431b2-19. 47 Cf. Met. VII 1 1, 1037a29; De an. III 8, 432a3-6. 48 Cf. Anal. Post. I 31, 88a2-8; II 19. On this see the more detailed discussion in Herzberg, S. 2011 :  Wahrnehmung und Wissen bei Aristoteles. Zur epistemologischen Funktion der Wahrnehmung, Berlin-New York. 49 Cf. De mem. 449b30-450a9. Both forms of dependence on the senses are expressed by 
Aristotle in the following sentence: "Hence no one can leam or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image (UVQ"flCTI /iµa !p{xvtaaµa n 8wpdv)" (De an. III 8, 432a7-9). SO This is especially emphasized by Wedin (see note 34), 229, 245. 
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already refers to divine thinking. 51 lt is more likely that this passage refers to thinking as it is treated in a general and structural manner in De an. III 4. In this chapter Aristotle wants to indicate clearly which differentia specifica defines the power of thinking and how thinking takes place. The faculty of reason is characterized, in an analogy to perception, as a receptive faculty (although not bound to an organ), which is "in itself" related to intelligible objects (vorrra): 
"The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible (a.na0s�), capable of receiving (ö6K'ttK6v) the form of an object [ . . .  ] Think­ing must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible." (429a15-18) 
If one disregards the specific dependence of human thinking on perception, then (theoretical) thinking is related "in itself" to what is of high ontological rank, namely to the simpliciter or "by nature" better-known essential struc­tures which underlie reality (cf. Met. A 7, 1O72a31). This ontological dignity is signalled by Aristotle with appropriate predicates like tiµtov, a.ya06v, 0siov and their comparative forms. This is especially clear at E. N. X 7, 1177a14 f., where he says, of the capacity which underlies the activity in accordance with highest virtue, that due to its nature (Ka.ta (j)Ucrtv) it has a cognitive access to the beautiful and divine things (fvvotav fx,siv 1tspl 1ea')..Jbv Kai 0sirov; see also 1177a19-21). Yet Met. A 7, 1072b18 f. does not just declare the essential relation of thinking to the objects of high ontological rank, the passage also states that there is a dependence of the dignity of the act of thinking on the dignity of its object: "And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense" (1072b18 f.). This dependence on the dignity of the object, which Aristotle will explic­itly come back to in A 9 (1074b29 f.), also shows itself in the pleasure which accompanies thinking: "the most complete is the most pleasant activity, and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete" (E. N. X 4, 1174b21-23; trans. Barnes, slightly altered). Thus "as such" thinking (v6ricr�), if it is directed to the best objects, can grant us the highest pleasure. This is what distinguishes it from all other conscious activities. With this we have found the suitable candidate for the activity on the basis of which we can further qualify the 'pure actuality' which constitutes the essence of the first principle and to which belongs 'ab­solute pleasure'. 
51 Like Ross (see note 32 II, 379) and Oehler (see note 41, 499), for example. 
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III. The Divine in Human Thinking ( 1072h19-24) 
After identifying human v6T)crt� as a suitable candidate for an analogy to the divine mode of being, in a further step Aristotle su6jects it to a detailed investigation 6y exploring the human intellect with regard to a divine element �t contains (cf. 1072623: ö ooKei 6 vou� Oeiov sxeiv). Before I present my Interpretation of this passage, I will have to mention two things: ( 1) in most cases Aristotle uses the predicate "divine" to describe the dignity of some­thing of high ontological rank. This results from the realization of different characteristics to different degrees, e.g. of actuality, separateness, eternity or being unmoved, which stand in a certain order of rank to each other. 52 Since the highest principle of reality has so far 6een identified as that which, 6y its very nature, is actuality (A 6, 1071620; A 7, 1072a32), it is reasonable to think of the dignifying predicate Oeiov in the first instance in the sense of being actual. In my view, one cannot presuppose a more elaborate meaning of 8eiov at this point unless one makes the problematic assumption that in l072b20 Aristotle has reached God's thinking-himself as an unstated conclu­sion, and unless one regards this special self-referring cognitive act as what 9eiov means here. (2) If Aristotle wants to point out something divine in human thinking, and thus to identify an affinity with the mode of being of the highest principle, then, in my view, this passage has the function of stating a reason why we are entitled to characterize God's 'pure activity ' on the basis of the "for us better known" human thinking, i.e. "from the 6ottom up". Since, as the highest ofoia, God belongs to the logical space of being and is thus precisely not e1ts1eetva n;� ou<rl�, we can regard the uncovering of a special 'structure of actuality '53 (and simultaneously of a high ontological dignity) in a certain activity of human life as proof of an affinity with the divine mode of being. Furthermore, we can claim - taking this as our starting �oint - to be able to gain knowledge of the kind and manner of his actuality, t.e., his essence. Thus after having selected v6TJ�, which has the highest �ignity in relation to the highest objects, from the preceding list of activities m 107261 8  f. Aristotle proceeds to examine this v6TJ� with regard to its 
0ntological value. Now, the intellect or thinking is not a uniform phenom­enon. Rather, we can distinguish different levels of this capacity to which helong different modes of activity. One may ask which mode of activity has the closest affinity to the mode of being of the highest principle. lt is striking that Aristotle immediately begins with the intellect's thinking itself: 
52 Cf. Met. VI 1, 1026a20-29, A 8, 1073b3-5; De part. an. l 5, 644b2S f.; De cael. I 9, 279a32; De an. I 4, 408b29. 
53 For this term see also Buddensiek, F. 1999: Die Theorie des Glücks in Aristoteles' Eudemi­scher Ethik, Göttingen, 236 f. 
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"And thinking thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of 
thinking; for it becomes an object of thinking in coming into contact 
with and thinking its objects, so that thinking and the object of thinking 
are the same. "54 
( 1072b20 f.; trans. Barnes with modifications) 
The question of why Aristotle begins with a statement which, at first glance, 
is so hard to understand can only be answered by looking at De an. III 4. He 
seems to presuppose that the reader is familiar with this chapter. According 
to Aristotle, the human intellect, before it acquires any knowledge, exists in 
pure potentiality. lt does not, therefore, belong to the things that exist in 
actuality : "it follows that it can have no nature of its own, other than that of 
having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by 
thought I mean that by which the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, 
not actually any real thing" (De an. III 4, 429a21-24; 429b30-430a2). As 
patt of the acquisition of knowledge the intellect receives the intelligible forms 
by which it becomes identical with the thinkable objects that are present in 
potentiality in the perceptible objects.55 Since, by its nature, the human intel­
lect is a potentiality,56 it does not, as such, prior to the acquisition of knowl­
edge, belong to the things which exist in actuality. lt is for this reason that 
the possession of the immaterial intelligible objects, i.e., the fact that it knows 
these habitually, means that the intellect and what is thought of are the same 
(430a3 f.). Through its "participation in the intelligible" the intellect has be­
come thinkable for itself. In this state, the intellect is on the level of the 'first 
actuality '. While it is still something which is potentially a thinker (more 
precisely : a contemplator) it can, however, in contrast to an intellect which 
merely has the potential for knowledge acquisition, at any time, "when it 
wants" or "through itself", move to the activity, i.e., the contemplation of 
the knowledge it has already acquired (De an. II 5, 417a26-28, b23 f.). This 
actualization consists then in nothing other than the intellect's thinking itself: 
"When thought becomes each intelligible thing in the way in which a 
man who actually knows is said to do so57 (this happens when he is able 
54 au-rov 6t voei 6 voßi; ICata l,lßtMTtljflV toß vontoO· vontoi; yap y{yvetat 9iyyavcov ical vomv, lbate 
tamov voßi; ical vo11t6v. 
55 This cognitive identity is one that is mediated through the intelligible forms, as Aristotle 
emphasizes especially at De an. III 8, 431b2o-432a3. On form as a cognitive means of 
reference see Owens, J. 1980: Form and Cognition in Aristotle, in: Ancient Philosophy, 1, 
17-27; Perler, D. 22004: Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, Frankfurt a. M.; Burn­
yeat, M. F. 2008: Aristotle's Divine Intellect, Milwaukee, 20-24. 
56 Cf. also De an. III 5, 430a14 f. 
57 Cf. also De an. III 7, 431b16 f. (öÄ.eoi; 6t 6 voßi; tcmv, 6 icat' tvt17Yeuxv, ta itp(xyµata). In this 
passage it becomes dear that the passage quoted above is about the intellect on the level of 
'first actuality'. See also Burnyeat (see note 55), 23. 
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to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is then able to think itself. "58 (De an. III 4, 42965-10; trans. Barnes with modifications) 
So, in humans, the thinking-itself of the intellect refers to nothing other then the act by which one reflects on the epistemic content previously acquired. This thinking-itself, which has to be sharply distinguished from the reflexive consciousness of this self-reference, 59 is thinking in the primary sense. 60 While we can also speak of thinking when we consider a certain synthesis of thoughts in order to arrive at a judgment which can be true or false,61 the primary meaning of thinking is the contemplation of the contents of knowl­edge already acquired - with which one is already sufficiently familiar - in their different interconnections.62 According to De an. II 5, 417b6 f., we are here dealing with a "development into its true seif or actuality" (e� auto yap ti E1tiaom� Kai Ei� tvteMxeiav). Such an actualization confers greater joy on a cognitive act than the acquisition of knowledge (E. N. X 7, 1177a26f.). Be­cause Aristotle is here concerned with thinking in the primary and definition­al sense, he addresses it right at the beginning of this passage. In this passage Aristotle also points out that the self-referential activity 
?f the intellect is possible only because of its prior grasp of or sharing in intelligible objects (Kata µttaÄ7l'lflV -roß vo71toß). Intellect becomes thinkable for itself only when it has received certain objects (1072b20 f.). The depen-
58 From what has been elaborated above, it becornes clear that it is possible - against the emendation of Bywater (6t' mitofi), which is followed by Ross - to retain the variant of the surviving manuscripts (6t ain:ov). Cf. Kahn, C. H. 1992: Aristotle on Thinking, in: M. C. Nussbaum/A. Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, 372-375; Gerson, 
L. P. 2009: Ancient Epistemology, Cambridge, 78 f. 
59 Cf. Oehler (see note 41), 498. As in the case of the other cognitive acts of human beings (perception, opinion) the reflexive consciousness of this thinking is incidental or secondary 
(cf. Met. A 9, 1074b35 f.). 6° Cf. Gerson (see note 58), 79: "lt is this actualisation that enables the intellect to 'think itself'. lt is this latter actualisation that constitutes thinking in the primary, definitional sense." 61 Cf. the connection between 6tavow und UlWÄ.11� in De an. III 3, 427b14-16, b25. Both are related to one another like the process to its result (cf. Hicks, R. D. 1907: Aristotle. De Anima. With translation, introduction and notes, Amsterdam, 457; Gerson (see note 58), 63): The discursive thinking on a certain state of affairs aims at a judgement which either takes the form of 6"91, bnoti})1lJ or cpp6vrJ�. 62 Cf. Dahl, N. 0. 201 1 :  Contemplation and eudairnonia in the Nicomachean Ethics, in: J. Miller (ed.), Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. A Critical Guide, Cambridge, 70: "Contempla­tion, thus, turns out to be reflective appreciation of the nature of the world as revealed by Aristotelian science." 
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dency on other objects for the actualization of VOTJO'� reveals the nature of the 
human intellect, which consists in 'pure potentiality '. This characterization of its essential nature does not only entail its basic receptivity63 and a merely limited self-sufficiency, insofar as self-referential thinking presupposes an ar­duous process of learning and is not simply available as such,64 but v6T)crt� (or 0f:copdv) is also determined in its content by the previously received intelli­gible objects and thus depends for its value on the value of the VOTJ'tll. This already shows the finitude of human thinking: the human mind is incapable of thinking itself in an unmediated way.65 Aristotle expresses this limitation of human thinking in the following sentences: 
"For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the substance,66 is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the latter rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. "67 ( 1072b22-24) 
Thus the human intellect is receptive (ÖEK'ttK6v) according to its nature and it can be active only when it already has certain intelligible objects at its disposal (tvepyEi öe excov), which then form the content of its contemplation (0ecop11µa.a: E. N. IX 4, 1166a26). With the help of his "triple scheme"68 Aristotle has distinguished different modal levels in which the intellect can exist and which correspond to different modes of thinking. On the basis of this, one can now ask what exactly it is about the human intellect that has the characteristic of being divine (0eiov), i.e., possesses a 'structure of actuali­ty ' akin to the divine mode of being, to 'pure actuality '. 
63 Cf. Burnyeat, M. F. 2002: De Anima II 5, in: Phronesis, 47, 71. 
64 In E. N. X 7, 1177a27 f. Aristotle claims that the criterion of self-sufficiency applies most 
to the contemplating activity (1' tE ÄE'yoµsvri autapJCEUl upl TI)v 8&0p11tuc1)v µcU.urt' liv d11). 
When the wise man has all the things which are necessary for life and leisure he can embark 
on the contemplation of the knowledge he has acquired previously. But only few people 
have the opportunity to acquire theoretical knowledge and even if they possess it there are 
hindrances to reflecting on it as such (see the precise observation in De an. II 5, 417a28). 
Thus human nature reveals itself as " in many ways in bondage" . One can indeed regard 
the acquisition of wisdom as beyond human power (Met. I 2, 982b28-30). 
65 Cf. Oehler, K. 1997: Subjektivität und Selbstbewußtsein in der Antike, Würzburg, 41. 
66 Kai is here to be understood in an explicative sense (cf. Bordt (see note 5), 120). 
67 to yap ÖEICTIICOV toß vo11toß JCai ti'i; oucrt� voß;, SVEpyEi 6t fxrov, coot' BJCdVOU µiiU.ov toßto 3 
6oJCEi 6 voß; 0eiov fxeiv, Kai T) 0eropia to 1'6unov Kai lipUJtov. Here I follow Ross and Jaeger 
who, contrary to the manuscripts and with the paraphrasis of the commentary of Ps.­
Alexander of Aphrodisias, prefer eJCE{vou µdllov toßto. 
68 Cf. Burnyeat (see note 63), 48. 
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. At this point, in the text there is an unclarity regarding the correct read­tng and translation of the Greek. 69 The reason for this is that Aristotle men­tions two elements, of which the one (= A) "more" (µallov) than the other (= B) realizes "the divine (0eiov) which thought seems to contain". However, he leaves the reference of both elements underdetermined by just using de­rnonstrative pronouns. Moreover, the search for the respective object of refer­ence is made more difficult by the fact that Aristotle does not say explicitly what the meaning of 0eiov is in this passage. If we understand Aristotle in such a way that he is Iooking for something divine in human thinking, name­ly in the sense of a structure of actuality which is similar to the 'pure actuali­
ty' of the first principle, then it may be natural to think - as in Ross's and Jaeger's reading of this passage - that .oßto (= A) refers to evepyei and tKeivou (= B) refers to ÖeKwcov. Since we are here dealing with human thinking, Which can be explained more precisely with the "triple scheme", the higher 
0ntological dignity lies with evepyei, on the basis of possession (fx<.0v70), i.e. th_e habitual knowledge, of the intelligible objects ('first actuality ' ), and thus W�th the act of contemplating certain epistemic contents ('second actuality ') Wtth which it has previously become identical (1O72b19-21). By contrast, the ÖeKnKov is the intellect on the level of the 'first potentiality ' which has no other nature than to be potentially identical in character with its object �De an. III 4, 429a1 5  f., a21-25). Therefore the sentence is to be understood �n such a way that "the latter", i.e., the activity in the sense of the thinking­itself of human thinking, "rather than the former", i.e., that "which is capa­ble of receiving the object of thought", is "the divine element which thought seerns to contain".71 From this it follows immediately that in human beings contemplation (8e<.0pia) is the most pleasant and best activity.72 
69 The surviving manuscripts read dxn' eK&ivo (= A) µallov tovtot> (= B) ö ÖOKd ö v� 9eiov fxeiv, 1Cai ij 9ecopia to fjöl<Jtov Kai lipto-rov. However, in their respective editions Ross and Jaeger (whom many translators follow in this) read cf>at' tlCetvou (= B) µallov toiJto (= A) 
ö öo1eet 6 v� Oetov fxeiv, 1eai ij Oecopia to fjöl<Jtov Kai lipl<Ttov with the paraphrasis of the commentary of Ps.-Alexander of Aphrodisias (698, 35 Hayduck). 70 Cf. De an. II 5, 417a25, a32f., b5. 71 Cf. Kosman (see note 30), 310: "we learn that it is active thinking that is most divine in us". Interestingly, the intellect "which is what it is by virtue of making all things" and which is essentially actuality and activity (De an. III 5, 430a18) is not included in this analysis. For a different interpretation see Reeve, C. D. C. 2012: Action, contemplation, and happiness: an essay on Aristotle, Cambridge-London, 215. 72 If one keeps to the reading of the manuscripts, tlCetvo (= A) can either be seen as referring to the öem1e6v or the toiJ VOT)toiJ. However, the intellect on the level of the 'first potentiality' (Öe1Ctt1e6v) cannot be of higher dignity than the intellect on the levcl of the 'ftrst actuality' (fxcov) or thc 'second actuality' (tvepyei). However, the intelligible object (toiJ VOT)toiJ) cannot be of higher dignity than thc possession of knowledge of it or rather the actuality based on this possession. While it is indeed the case that the value of the act of thinking dcpends on the value of the object thought of and while the objects have priority insofar as it is through 
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If one looks back to the interpretation of Met. 1072b19-24 just devel­oped, it becomes evident that it requires fewer additional assumptions (no presupposition of an identity of kind) than the standard interpretation, that it is closer to the text (no unstated conclusions) and that, in general, it is more faithful to Aristotle's procedure in Met. A 6-7, which is guided by the nature of the subject matter (the 'transcendence' of the first principle). If this interpretation is correct, then Aristotle's aim in this whole passage is to justify why we are entitled to take the "for us better known" human thinking as our point of departure when characterizing in more detail the mode of being of the eternal, unmoved and separate substance. Through an analysis of hu­man thinking, which is guided by the "triple schema", it becomes clear that among human activities contemplation, qua actualization of previously ac­quired knowledge, has the highest ontological dignity. Due to its special 'structure of actuality '73 and its specific pleasure, 0eropia emerges as, among all human activities, most akin to the mode of being of the first principle, which is essentially actuality and purest pleasure. The Ötayroyr'J of the first principle can, therefore, be characterized as 0eropia or v6ricr�; in 1072b15 it is 0eropia which can be called upon as a point of comparison. 74 The God is always active in this magnificent way, which is possible for us to do only sometimes ( 1072b24 f.) One does not have to read the next sentence (ei öe µcvJ..ov . . .  ) in order to realize already that besides the merely temporal duration of the act there has to be a deeper difference between human and divine contemplation which relates to the nature of this activity itself. Human contemplation is 
them that the different capacities are defined (De an. II 4, 415a20-22; Met. IX 8) it is 
nevertheless true that prior to their being received by the intellect the intelligible objects lie 
in the individual perceptible objects, which have matter, only in potentiality (De an. III 4, 
430a6 f.; III 8, 432a3-5). If it were otherwise, Aristotle would have no objective reason to 
introduce something like the 'active intellect' which - like a non-material medium - makes 
the intelligible objects, which reside in the perceptible individual things in potentiality, actu­
ally knowable, so that they can be received by the 'passive intellect' (De an. III 5, 430a15-
1 7). 
73 Contemplation is an activity (evspyeia) in the narrow, technical sense of Met. IX 6, 
1048618-36. Learning, or the acquisition of knowledge, is a process which, as such, has 
an external goal and where the reaching of this goal also coincides with the temporal end 
of the process (it comes "to a standstill" : Phys. VIII 3, 247611 f.). Thinking, however, in 
the sense of contemplation is a perfect activity: it has its goal in itself; in every moment of 
its actualization its goal is reached. An activity of this kind can be continued for any length 
of time. In this respect this kind of thinking is similar to the circular motion. 
74 Cf. Kosman (sec note 30), 311: "The claim that God thinks turns out to mean that since 
the activity of thinking is divine, it may therefore be the clearest icon we have of the being 
of the divine principle whose essential nature is activity, and on which depend heaven and 
earth." 
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0nly possible because of a previous acquisition of knowledge which is based 
00 an intellect which by its nature is 'pure potentiality'. Because of this de­pendence on other objects, human contemplation is self-sufficient in a limited sense only, and in its content and dignity it depends in each case on the objects received (liUo ciptov). lt is a thinking that can think itself only via �eference to 'other beings'.75 This cognitive self-reference, mediated, as it 
18, by external objects, has only an "incidental" (sv 1rapepycp: Met. A 9, 1074b36) reflexive consciousness. As Wedin rightly points out against a pre­sumed unity of kind, the fact that thinking-itself is, as Aristotle states, based 
0n an 'intellect in potentiality', affects the mode of 0scopia itself. One is, therefore, not allowed to simply, and without further qualification, make 8sropia, as it occurs in humans, the standard, i.e., to carry it over in the very same sense to God. 76 Aristotle himself draws our attention to the foundations upon which human thinking rests and that it is only a certain mode of this thinking which contains something divine, i.e., has an ontological affinity to God's mode of being. Thus, in our passage, Aristotle gives us a further characterization of God's mode of being: God is pure thinking without any potentiality. How­ever, unlike the previous features, it cannot be "conceptually" deduced from the 'pure actuality', but only transferred to God - albeit with modifications -by taking as our starting point the "for us better known" highest human �ctivity. We do not, at this point, know what exactly God's 0scopia consists �n (see Met. A 9); yet we do know this much: that God's thinking, since he 
18 'pure actuality', cannot be based on an intellect which is potentiality by nature and, therefore, likewise cannot be based on an acquisition of knowl­edge in which 'external' intelligible objects are received (see E. E. VII 12, l245bl 7-19). lt is for this reason that divine thinking cannot be identical in kind with human thinking. 77 
75 Cf. Oehler (see note 65), 40-43. 76 Wedin (see note 34, 233) argues against Norman's thesis as follows: "First, if Norman is correct about sameness in degree, then man's theoretic activity will be the measure of the god's. For as activity the fact that our mind is also a potentiality does not enter the picture and that is what is relevant here. The point, rather, is that the two sorts of activity differ -unless, what Norman cannot allow, admixture of potentiality affects, downward, rhe quali­ty of human theorizing." (italics in the original) 77 In the case of God there is no relation to external objects: he can think himself, i.e., pure 
thinking without it being necessary to have received external objects before (cf. Oehler (see 
note 41)). He is self-sufficient in an eminent sense. His thinking cannot be regarded as a 
mere instance of the thinking-itself referred to at 1072b19-21: it differs from this thinking in an essential way. In the case of God the reflexive consciousness, which appears only sv naptpycp in human cognition (1074b36), moves - due to the absence of a cognitive relation to the world - to the centre. 
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IV. A look at E. N. X 8 and a conclusion 
The method of argument we have just elaborated is significantly different from the one in E. N. X 8, 117867-32. In that passage, Aristotle provides a further reason for why the perfect happiness of humans is "a certain contem­plative activity" (0eropTJTlkJ1 t� evepyeia: 117867 f.). If we take the widespread opinion that the gods are blessed and happy to the highest degree78 as our starting point (u1te1Atjcpaµev: 117869), that they live79 - as all assume (mxv­m; 1>1te1Atjcpacnv) - and are, therefore, active (�fjv [ . . .  ] Kai evepyeiv ö.pa: 1178618 f. ), 80 and if we can rule out that the gods are either engaged in virtuous action in its various forms or in the production81  of things, then the activity of the God, which surpasses everything eise in 61essedness (µaKa­p16tTJT1 ötacpepouoa), has to 6e one of contemplation (1178b22). Now, if God is happy to the highest degree and exclusively engaged in the activity of contemplation, then there has to 6e an intrinsic connection 6etween 0eropia and happiness. Among all human activities the one that is most akin (ouyye­vecrt«xtTJ) to the activity of God will be associated with the greatest happiness. For humans, life is happy "insofar as some kind of likeness (oµoiroµa t1) of such activity belongs to them" (1178b26 f.) .82 Aristotle combines this similar­ity relation with a gradation model: "Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully 6elongs are more truly happy (Kai o� µ(lAA()v um'lpxe1 to 0eropeiv, Kai euomµoveiv), not accidentally, but in virtue of the contemplation [ . . .  ] " .  83 This gives rise to the fundamental question of whether the gradual differ­ence pertains only to the temporal extension, during which in God and hu­man beings the same kind of contemplation takes place to a different degree (that what God is engaged in permanently human 6eings can do only for a limited time), or whether it pertains to the nature of contemplation itself, which would, in that case, exist "as such" in different degrees. The latter would mean that, in contrast to God, human 6eings would manifest what it 
78 Cf. also E. N. I 1 2, 1101b23f. 
79 On this endoxon see also Met. A 7, 1072b28 f. 
80 "Life" logically implies "activity" or "actuality", but not vice versa (see above). 
81 "Life" is here qualified as rational life, namely that it consists either in action, production 
or contemplation (cf. Top. VI 6, 145a15 f.; Met. VI 1, 1025b25; E. N. VI 2, 1139a27 f.). 
82 In Aristotle's writings the concept of similarity often occurs together with the concept of 
kinship, e.g., E. N. VI 2, 1 139a10 f. (1ea8' 6µol.Otll't« nva 1eni oi1es\Ö't'll't<l); Top. I 7, 103a18 f. 
(/imxvra yap 'ta 't0tnß't<l auyysvrj 1eni mxpnM1'ma ciA),N,otc; 0011esv stvm); Top. I 10, 104a19 f. 
(itClV't(l yap öµow Kni auyysvrj 't(lU't' i!O\K6V stvm); Rhet. I 11 ,  1371b18 (itaV't(l 'tCl aunsvi1 KCli 
öµota t'löea ehe; tn:i 't0 ltOÄ.U). 
83 On this compare Kraut, R. 1989: Aristotle on the Human Good, Princeton, 39-77. 
God as Pure Thinking. An Interpretation of Metaphysics A 7, 1072b14-26 177 
rneans to be active in the form of contemplation only in a Iimited way and that it cannot be predicated of them in a univocal, but only in a derivative or analogous sense. 84 Only God would manifest contemplation in an unlimit­ed and perfect way. Looking towards him we could understand what it tneans, to lead a life of contemplation. 
. The concept of similarity, which Aristotle uses at 1 178b27 to character­�ze the relation between human and divine contemplation, can be interpreted 10 both ways. lt can be applied to things of the same kind, which differ in the way in which they individually express the nature of their respective kind, as well as to things which do not stand to each other in the relation of belonging to the same genus, as in an analogy or in the pros hen-unity (see 
Top. I 1 7; E. N. I 4, 1096626-29) . 85 A gradual difference (to µti.U.ov tcai to �ttov) is not only found in the category of quality (cf. Cat. 3b39-4a2), but for Aristotle things belonging to different kinds can also exist to different degrees: "Those who think there is only one (kind) because (friendship) ad­�its of degrees (to µti.U.ov tcai to �nov) have relied on an inadequate indica­tton; for even things different in species {tcai ta faepa tq> eiöei) admit of de­�ree" (E. N. VIII 2, 1 1 55613-15; trans. Barnes; slightly altered). Therefore, JUst 6ecause one can talk a6out the different degrees of something, this does not necessarily indicate that there is qualitative difference within one and the sa�e kind. On the contrary, it can also be used for things differing in kind, as 10 the case of different kinds of friendship, for example, 86 or of different genera of 6eing. 87 
. The fundamental question of whether divine and human contemplation co10cide with regard to their kind cannot be decided on the 6asis of E. N. X 8. The main reason for this is the equivocal concept of similarity, which Aristotle does not specify any further in that text. In E. N. X 8 as well as in 
Met. A 7 he simply makes clear that contemplation can exist in different de­�ees (1 1 78629 f.; 1072625). What follows from E. N. X 8 - and here espe­cially from the emphasis on the superiority of divine happiness ( 1 178622) -leaves at least logical space for a reading which sees here an essential differ­ence 6etween divine and human contemplation. 88 My reading of Met. A 7, 
84 The indefinite pronoun in 0&copia � (1178632) would have a "weakening" function here 
(cf. Wedin (see note 34), 212n3). 85 For Aristorle, "similarity" is not an irreducible concept. Rather, for him it is a concept based on a certain kind of unity or common feature 'below' numerical unity and which can, at the same time, indicate a gradual difference that eludes a definitive definition. (cf. 
�app 1992). Basically, it is true to say: "[F]or in so far as they have any identical attribute, 
86 In so far they are alike" (Top. I 17, 108a16 f.). 
87 Cf. E. N. VIII 5, 1 157a12-14; VIII 8, 1 158b4 f. Cf. Met. VII 1, 1028a25 f.; XIV 1, 1088a29 f. 88 Cf. also Wedin (see note 34), 211 ,  229, 245. 
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1072b14-26 has suggested that we should positively assume such a difference in kind. I have tried to show that such an alternative interpretation is indeed possible and also better. Moreover, with regard to E. N. X 8 my interpretation has an interesting upshot concerning the way the argument unfolds. Whereas in E. N. X 8 Aristotle characterizes the perfect happiness of human beings by proceeding "top down", i.e., by starting with the perfect happiness of God and making use of endoxa for the further characterization of God's activity, the argument in Met. A 7, 1072b14-26 takes exactly the opposite approach. Here Aristotle proceeds "bottom up" starting from the highest form of human thinking and transferring this per analogiam to the divine mode of being. 89 This can make better sense of the eternal, unmoved, separate substance whose essence is actuality. Because of the special ontological status, one has to as­sume that God manifests our best form of life, i.e. 0eropia, in an even higher way. Aristotle claims that this possibility is, in fact, realized by closing his argument with the following sentence: "If, then, God is always in that good state, this compels our wonder; and if in a better (µillov) this compels it even more. And God is in a better state (fxe1 oe rooe)" (1072624-26; with E. E. 1245b16-19 and E. N. 1178b28-30). 
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